Th is paper expands on the methodology of Groshen and Potter (2003) for studying cyclical and structural changes in the US economy and analyzes the net structural and cyclical employment trends in the US economy during the last 10 trough-to-trough business cycles from 1949 to the present. It illustrates that the US manufacturing sector and an increasing number of services sectors, including parts of the fi nancial services sector, are experiencing structural employment declines. Structural employment gains in the US labor market are increasingly concentrated in the healthcare, education, food, and professional and technical services sectors and in the occupations related to these industries. Th e paper concludes that the improved operation of the US labor market during the 1990s has reversed itself in the 2000s, with negative long-term economic eff ects for the United States. Author's note: Th e author would like to thank his colleagues at the Peterson Institute for International Economics C. Fred Bergsten, Adam S. Posen, and Howard F. Rosen for a multitude of extremely useful comments and suggestions that greatly improved this paper.
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"It is a crisis of confi dence.… As you know, there is a growing disrespect for government and for churches and for schools, the news media, and other institutions. Th is is not a message of happiness or reassurance, but it is the truth and it is a warning."
-President Jimmy Carter, televised speech, July 15, 1979 One of the strongest and most durable historical-economic correlations is the link between the services sector's shares of total output and employment and average income levels. Simply put, the greater the role services play in an economy, the richer it is, and vice versa. However, the current global economic crisis has hit at the very core of the global services economy. It has humbled previously gravitydefying global fi nancial centers, has stopped the engine of globalization in its tracks by causing the fi rst contraction of global trade since World War II, and has led to the largest decline in global output in decades. Th e forward-looking alphabetic debate about the shape of the inevitable global economic recovery-will it be an L, V, W, or an inverse √?-has already been raging for some time and seems principally to be a debate about whether or the degree to which historic growth patterns will hold or if this time is really diff erent. 1 One thing, however, that defi nitely is diff erent in this crisis is that it has spawned a reassessment of the benefi ts of the continuing economic shift toward some of the very sophisticated and high-wage services sectors, notably fi nancial services. It is a recurring theme in much of the commentary on the crisis that the UK and US fi nancial sectors grew to be far too large, were ultimately unsustainable, and have delivered little in terms of lasting welfare gains to anyone beyond a very select group of banking executives and traders. Somewhere along the way, the fi nancial-services sector evolved from being just that-a sector that provided fi nancial services to the rest of the economy into just a "fi nancial sector," detached from the rest of economy and producing little beyond leveraged products for its own consumption.
2 For the fi rst time there seems to be a broadening consensus that it would be a good thing for the US and UK fi nancial sectors to shrink in economic importance and that it would be valuable for national welfare if a large part of this sector's highly quantitatively skilled workforce did something more productive in the long term for the country as a whole. Yet until August 2007, fi nancial services and other related high-valuedadded knowledge services were viewed as the end of the economic growth rainbow. Countries that had successfully exited the "twentieth-century manufacturing economy" and had entered these sectors and established global or regional fi nancial and services centers seemed assured of reaping the vast economic rewards of the "postindustrial, twenty-fi rst century services economy." cycle will see a qualitatively diff erent US postindustrial services economy begin to emerge. Or perhaps, after everything is said and done, there will not be much change at all.
What will the shape of the future US labor market be and where will employment growth be concentrated? Th is paper attempts to provide an answer to these questions by looking at historical, long-term structural and cyclical net employment trends in the United States. Which sectors have seen structural employment gains until now, which sectors have been in decline, and how have these trends shifted over time?
SCALE OF THE CURRENT US LABOR-MARKET SLOWDOWN IN HISTORICAL COMPARISON
It is important to recognize just how severe the labor-market impact of the current US downturn has been. Th is downturn is now the most severe labor-market contraction since World War II (Mussa 2009 ).
It is therefore now especially relevant to ask questions about the relative strengths of structural and cyclical developments. Th e severity of the current downturn is illustrated in fi gure 1. months leading up to the business-cycle peak than in the current recession.
Another way to illustrate the scale of the current labor-market crisis in the United States is to look 3. By some measures, the short recession of 1980-81 was shallower than the 1960 recession in employment terms. However, due to its short duration, 1960 was picked as the shallowest recession in fi gure 1. 5. Employment data for April, May, and June 2009 in this paper are preliminary.
6. Total private nonfarm employment at the 1953 peak was 43.8 million, or just over one third of the 115.8 million at the peak in 2007. It makes no sense to compare absolute numbers of job losses in diff erent recessions, as the starting points are diff erent and the US labor market much larger during later recessions.
4
at the rate of long-term unemployment, i.e., the share of the unemployed who have been unemployed for more than 27 weeks. Typically, long-term unemployment will rise during a recession, as new job openings decline with the economic downturn. Th e fl exible US labor market has historically had very low levels of long-term unemployment, especially compared with European countries. However, as can be seen in fi gure 2, which compares long-term US unemployment levels during the last 10 NBER recessions in a manner similar to fi gure 1, there has been a general increase in long-term unemployment levels in the United States since the business-cycle peaks of the early 1980s. Figure 2 shows that the US long-term unemployment level in the current recession is signifi cantly higher than during any previous postwar recession, is substantially above the two cycles that previously had the highest long-term unemployment rates (1981 and 2001) , and is about three times the longterm unemployment level of the cycle with the lowest rate (1969) . At a current level of 29 percent in June 2009, 7 it is increasingly legitimate to ask whether the much-acclaimed US labor market is turning increasingly "European," as it is progressively less able to generate suffi cient new jobs to prevent persistent high levels of long-term unemployment.
It is also instructive to look beyond the standard unemployment rate and focus on the so-called labor underutilization rate, which in addition to all unemployed workers includes those marginally attached to the labor force and those who "unwillingly" work part time for economic reasons. 8 Figure 3 compares the December 2007 business-cycle peak with the 2001 peak, as in fi gures 1 and 2.
9 Figure 3 shows that the US labor underutilization rate has risen far higher during the current recession than in the downturn in 2001, where labor underutilization was basically fl at at 9 to 10 percent following the business-cycle peak. By contrast, during the current downturn, labor underutilization has continued to rise each month after December 2007 to a historic high (for the period of available data after 1999) of 16.5 percent in June 2009. Th is suggests that the level of "slack" in the US economy during the current recession, to a degree far higher than during the 2001 recession when labor underutilization was stable, has risen beyond what is indicated by the standard US unemployment rate.
Not only has the US unemployment rate risen faster than during earlier US recessions but also US workers unfortunate enough to lose their jobs are remaining unemployed for longer periods of time during this recession. And there are also far more marginally attached workers and "involuntary" parttime workers in this recession. Th e US labor market is in a downturn of historic proportions.
7. Long-term unemployment is by nature a lagging indicator. During the 1981 cycle, long-term unemployment peaked at 26 percent in June 1983, 24 months after the business-cycle peak, while in the 2001 cycle it peaked at 23.6 percent in March 2004, 36 months after the business-cycle peak. Current levels of long-term unemployment throughout the 3-month period from April-June 2009 are already above the ultimate peak levels for all prior US business cycles.
8. Th e denominator for the labor underutilization rate is the total labor force plus marginally attached workers.
9. Th e earliest available data for labor underutilization are from January 1999, so comparisons cannot be made with earlier business cycles.
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STRUCTURAL VS. CYCLICAL NET EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS IN THE US LABOR MARKET
What implications will this recessions' severe US labor-market downturn have for employment trends going forward? Will we see a powerful cyclical rebound, as employers suddenly begin to (re)hire workers, i.e., a V-shaped recovery? Or is the current downturn of a more structural character, where the jobs that have disappeared so far will not come back to the same industries but instead will come in other, new industries?
One way to cast some light on this issue, building on the methodology in Groshen and Potter (2003) , is to look at the historical US business cycles as defi ned by the NBER and to separate the total US economy and workforce into four distinct sectoral categories:
Procyclical sectors: sectors that show faster net employment growth rates than the total workforce during expansions but slower net employment growth (or faster relative net employment declines) during contractions. Th ese sectors will see more jobs created during expansions and more jobs lost during contractions relative to the economy as a whole. As a result, procyclical sectors are likely to have a relatively stable share of total employment in the long run over multiple business cycles.
Countercyclical sectors: sectors that show slower net employment growth rates than the total workforce during expansions but faster net employment growth (or slower relative net employment declines) during contractions. Countercyclical sectors will generate fewer jobs during expansions than the total economy, but will also lose fewer during recessions. Th ese sectors generally provide for stable and secure employment, but also do not grow signifi cantly as a share of the total labor market over several cycles. Structural-gains sectors: sectors that show faster net employment growth rates than the total workforce during expansions and faster net employment growth (or slower relative net employment declines) during contractions. Structural-gains sectors create a lot of jobs during expansions and shed relatively few of them during contractions. As a result, these sectors will expand their total share of employment in the economy over multiple business cycles. Structural-losses sectors: sectors that show slower net employment growth rates than the total workforce during expansions and slower net employment growth (or faster relative net employment declines) during contractions. Structural-loss sectors create relatively few new jobs during expansions and often shed many more during recessions than the economy as a whole. Th ese sectors gradually decline in employment importance in the economy.
Typically, a business cycle is defi ned as a sequence of four phases: contraction, trough, expansion, and peak (followed again by a contraction). 10 A cycle's duration is usually measured from one peak to the next. Given that we are currently in the contraction phase of a US business cycle and thus are waiting for the next trough to occur, but also that it is highly desirable to use the most recent data for any forwardlooking analysis, measuring the business cycle from peak to peak is not optimal, as we would have to stop at the most recent peak in December 2007.
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Instead, in order to utilize the most recent labor-market data, this paper adopts a methodology that measures the US business cycle from trough to trough, with the business cycle proceeding through the four phases of trough, expansion, peak, and contraction. Furthermore, as indicated above, given that the total US labor force has been constantly increasing with population growth since World War II, the sectoral employment growth rates that are of interest for this paper are the employment growth rates relative to total US labor-force growth for a given period, i.e., this paper aims to assess whether a sector grows faster or slower over the business cycle than does the total US labor force.
All employment data, unless otherwise noted, are seasonally adjusted data from the BLS Current Employment Statistics (CES) database. 13 However, due to the regular industry reclassifi cations of CES data and in particular the switch from Standard Industrial Classifi cation (SIC) to North American Industry Classifi cation System (NAICS) industry classifi cations in 2003, industry data for the entire 10-cycle, 60-year period are available only at a relatively high level of aggregation. 14 More detailed CES 11. Moreover, since labor-market trends during the business cycles' contraction and expansion periods are used in this paper to identify which of the four sectoral categories a given industry belongs to, it is not necessary to measure a full business cycle from peak to peak. Instead, for our purposes a "business cycle" must merely include both an expansionary and a contractionary period.
12. See, for example, National Association for Business Economics (NABE 2009), Mussa (2009) , and the cover story in Newsweek, August 23, 2009.
13. When compared with the BLS Current Population Survey (CPS), the BLS CES data do not include unincorporated self-employed, unpaid family workers, agriculture and related workers, private household workers, and workers absent without pay. Further, CES data count each nonagricultural wage and salary job held by multiple jobholders as separate jobs. Since 2001, the CPS and CES surveys have had very similar trend developments. Due to its far-larger sample size and annual benchmarking, the CES has a sampling error of only about one quarter of the CPS. Since the focus of this paper is employment trends, the CES is therefore the best data source. See Bowler and Morisi (2006) However, this relative stability in sectors' weight in the US economy over time that comes from generally being either a procyclical or a countercyclical sector is not found when disaggregating the US labor market in other ways. Th is is illustrated in fi gure 5, which in a manner similar to fi gure 4 compares the 10-cycle, 60-year time-series of employment growth in the goods-producing and private servicesproviding sectors.
16 Figure 5 shows that since the mid-1950s the US goods sector has experienced large structural losses in employment. Only during the fi rst included business cycle, from 1949-54, was the goods sector solidly procyclical. In the early 1970s and briefl y from 1980-82, it was marginally procyclical, as employment grew slightly faster during expansion periods. Figure 5 illustrates that for the last three decades, whether during expansions or contractions, US goods manufacturing has consistently experienced weaker job growth than total nonfarm employment.
Similarly, and again as an almost mirror image, fi gure 5 shows that the private services sector has generally experienced structural gains in employment over the last 60 years in the US labor market.
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Th ese historical structural losses and structural gains characteristic of the goods and private services sectors, respectively, have yielded a gradual shift in US employment away from goods sectors toward private services sectors. As a result, the share of total nonfarm employment in the goods sector has declined from 37 percent in 1949 to just 15 percent in 2009, while the share of total employment in the 15. Total nonfarm employment -government employment = total private nonfarm employment.
16. Given the relative stability of the government's employment share and its small size relative to private services-sector employment, including government employment with private services-sector employment would make virtually no diff erence in the results: Figure 5 would look virtually identical if the total services sector is used instead of just the private services sector.
17. Total nonfarm employment -goods-producing employment -government employment = total private servicesproviding employment.
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private services sector has risen from 49 to 68 percent over the same period. 18 Figure 5 demonstrates this gradual employment shift toward the services sectors in the US economy over the last 60 years.
Long-Term Historical Trends in Structural vs. Cyclical Employment Eff ects in BLS Supersectors
Going into greater sectoral detail for private employment trends, it is possible to illustrate the same long-term trends in employment over the entire 10-cycle, 60-year time-series for each of the so-called BLS supersectors for which NAICS data have been reconstructed going back to before 1949. 19 Starting in fi gure 6 with the mining/logging and construction sectors, it is evident that the mining and logging supersector has shifted around the quadrants quite dramatically over individual business cycles. 20 It is noteworthy, however, that the sector is found in the upper-right, structural-gains quadrant during periods of rapidly rising energy and commodity prices, such as in the late 1970s and during the most recent economic cycle. Figure 6 also shows that the construction sector has generally been procyclical in recent decades. Figure 7 shows the manufacturing sector, which looks very similar to the total goods sector shown in fi gure 5. 21 With the US manufacturing sector in the current business cycle far into the lower-left corner of fi gure 7, the sector is experiencing accelerating structural employment decline.
Shifting now to services sectors, which as we saw in fi gure 5 are expanding in aggregate, fi gure 8 shows the 10-cycle, 60-year time-series for the trade, transportation, and utilities and information sectors.
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It is striking that neither of these two services sectors is among the sectors that have been structurally gaining employment since 1949, and as such they have very much bucked the aggregate services sector's structural employment growth trend. Instead, fi gure 8 shows that for at least the last 20 years the trade, transportation, and utilities sector has been in structural decline. Th e emergence of Wal-Mart, just-intime business models, and utilities liberalization have seemingly had a negative aggregate impact on the employment trends of this sector. It will likewise surprise few who have followed the current crisis in 18. Note that the share of government employment in total employment rose by about 4 percent from 1949 to 1970.
19. Reconstructed CES data going back to 1939 exist also for the sectors of durable goods, nondurable goods, wholesale trade, retail trade, and federal government employment. Th e included supersectors sum up to total US private employment.
20. Th is supersector includes NAICS categories 113, "Forestry and logging," and 21, "Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction." Note that because the CES is a nonfarm data survey, large parts of NAICS category 11, "Agriculture, forestry, fi shing, and hunting," are excluded. Th e construction sector equals NAICS category 23, "Construction."
21. Th e manufacturing sector equals NAICS categories 31-33, "Manufacturing."
22. Th e trade, transportation, and utilities supersector contains NAICS 22, "Utilities," NAICS 42, "Wholesale trade," NAICS 44-45, "Retail trade," and NAICS 48-49, "Warehousing and transportation." Th e information supersector consists of NAICS category 51, "Information."
the print media that the aggregate information-services sector shifted into the structural employment losses quadrant in the last business cycle after having been strongly procyclical during the 1990s. After having been cyclical for two decades (and two cycles), the information sector is currently in structural employment decline. Perhaps the positive impact of the internet on sector employment is receding.
Turning to the fi nancial activities supersector, which as mentioned at the outset many commentators have recommended should shrink in the United States, fi gure 9 shows that this relative decline seems to already be under way. 23 It is striking that the US fi nancial activities sector, for the fi rst time in 60 years and 10 business cycles, shifted into the structural losses quadrant during the most recent business cycle. Th is is after having experienced structural gains for 30 years from 1961 to 1991 and countercyclical growth during the 1990s. Unlike aggregate services sectors as a whole, it is clear that structural employment gains in the United States have shifted away from fi nancial activities. From fi gures 8, 9, and 10 it is clear that the consistent, aggregate structural employment gains in the private services sector seen in fi gure 5 are unevenly distributed across individual services sectors, as no structural net employment gains have occurred in the trade, transportation, and utilities sector, the information sector, the fi nancial activities sector, or the professional and business services sector during the last 20 years. However, fi gure 11 shows that very strong net structural employment gains have been consistent in the US education and healthcare sector, as well as in the US leisure and hospitality sector for more than 50 years.
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Finally, fi gure 12 shows that in the most recent business cycle, the last, residual supersector, "other services," moved away from net structural employment gains and became a countercyclical sector. 26 Th is makes it clear that structural net employment gains in the aggregate US private services sector are now 23. Th is supersector contains NAICS 52, "Finance and insurance," and NAICS 53, "Real estate and rental and leasing."
24. Th is supersector contains NAICS 54, "Professional, scientifi c, and technical services," NAICS 55, "Management of companies and enterprises," and NAICS 56, "Administrative and support and waste management and remediation services."
25. Th e education and healthcare supersector includes NAICS 61, "Education services," and NAICS 62, "Healthcare and social assistance." Th e leisure and hospitality supersector includes NAICS 71, "Arts, entertainment, and recreation," and NAICS 72, "Accommodation and food services."
26. Th is supersector equals NAICS 81, "Other services (except public administration)." overwhelmingly concentrated in the education and healthcare sector and the leisure and hospitality sector.
Th e net structural employment gains among private services sectors are much more narrowly focused than during earlier US business cycles, when net structural employment gains were also found in both the fi nancial activities and the professional and business services sectors.
A DETAILED LOOK AT THE MOST RECENT US BUSINESS CYCLE
Another way to illustrate the structural and cyclical employment trends in diff erent sectors in greater detail is to plot all industries in the economy during a given cycle. As can be seen in fi gure 13, some of the BLS supersectors are relatively large in their share of total employment; the transportation, trade, and utilities sector is the largest sector at 19 percent of total employment. Th e increased data availability after 1990 allows for a more detailed analysis of the net employment trends within individual supersectors. Th is section will now look in greater detail at the manufacturing; trade, transportation, and utilities; information; fi nancial activities; professional and business services; education and healthcare; and leisure and hospitality supersectors. Figure 14 shows that the net structural employment losses in the manufacturing sector over the last business cycle were widely distributed across individual industries within manufacturing. Th ese losses were greatest in industries related to transportation equipment, apparel and textiles, and wood and furniture production. 27 Th e two metagroups of durable and nondurable goods manufacturing were both in net structural employment decline, and only the sectors related to food, petroleum and coal products, and electronic and communication products were countercyclical in nature. Figure 15 shows that within the trade, transportation, and utilities supersector, only the strongly government-linked transit and ground passenger transportation sector saw structural net employment 27 . Th e location of the total supersector in fi gures 14 to 20 is shown by a dashed bubble.
gains in the most recent business cycle, 28 while structural net employment losses were concentrated in the large retail trade sector (especially among auto dealers) and in air, rail, and truck transportation. However, the diverse nature of the trade, transportation, and utilities supersector makes for an irregular distribution of subsectors, with large procyclical sectors in wholesale trade and in transportation and warehousing. Th e stable utilities sector was a straightforward countercyclical sector. Figure 16 illustrates that there were very clear divisions within the information supersector, with "Hollywood" and the other information services sectors strongly countercyclical in employment terms, while publishing (which includes newspapers, periodicals, books, and software publishing) and noninternet broadcasting (radio, television, and cable) experienced net structural employment losses.
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Th e telecommunications (wired, wireless, and satellite) sector was in slight structural decline, with job losses during the current contraction closely resembling those in the general economy. 30 Similarly, the data processing sector, which includes providers of infrastructure for hosting and data processing services such as web hosting, streaming, application hosting, and general time-share mainframe facilities, saw job losses that closely mirrored those of the total US economy in the current contraction. As such, there are few immediate signs of large-scale job losses due to off shoring and off shore outsourcing in this sector. Figure 17 shows that the fi nancial activities supersector, which as we saw in fi gure 13 experienced net structural employment losses in aggregate, includes highly diverse sectors located in all four quadrants of fi gure 17. Th e sectors of depository credit intermediation (which includes commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions); commercial banking; and funds, trusts, and other fi nancial vehicles (a sector dominated by pension funds, but that also includes health and welfare funds and other insurance and investment pools and funds) all experienced structural net employment gains during the most recent business cycle, suggesting the continued expansion of retail-oriented fi nancial activities in the United
States.
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In contrast to gains in these sectors, the securities, commodity contracts, and other fi nancial investments and related activities and nondepository and activities related to credit intermediation 28. Transit and ground passenger transportation equals NAICS category 485 and includes a variety of passenger transportation activities, such as urban transit systems; chartered bus, school bus, and interurban bus transportation; and taxis.
29. "Hollywood," or the motion picture and sound recording industries, equals NAICS category 512, "Motion picture and sound recording industries." Th is subsector also includes workers at movie theaters. Th e other information services subsector equals NAICS 519 and includes "News syndicates," "Libraries and archives," as well as "Internet publishing and broadcasting and web search portals." Th e publishing industries subsector equals NAICS 511, "Publishing industries (except internet)." It is not possible to break out the software publishing sector from NAICS 511 to examine it in isolation. Th e noninternet broadcasting, or broadcasting except internet, subsector equals NAICS 515, "Broadcasting (except internet)."
30. Th is sector equals NAICS 517, "Telecommunications."
31. Th e depository credit intermediation subsector equals NAICS 522, "Credit intermediation and related activities." Th e funds, trusts, and other fi nancial vehicles subsector equals NAICS 525, "Funds, trusts, and other fi nancial vehicles."
13 industries both experienced structural net employment losses in the most recent business cycle. 32 Th e former industry essentially equals "Wall Street" and includes many of the industries at the heart of the current fi nancial crisis, such as investment banking and securities dealing, securities brokerage, commodity contracts dealing and brokerage, securities and commodities exchanges, portfolio and asset management, and investment advisory and fi nancial investment activities. As such, it is possible that a longer-term shrinking of Wall Street through structural net employment losses has already begun in the United States.
Similar losses were experienced in the nondepository and activities related to credit intermediation industry, which includes other crisis-related sectors such as credit card issuance, consumer lending, real estate fi nancing, and mortgage loan brokerage. Th e long-term shrinkage of these sectors in the US economy seems to have already begun, as job losses in the most recent cycle were of a structural nature.
Th e intense structural net employment losses in the rental and leasing services industry during the most recent cycle are not surprising, considering that this sector includes industries such as rental cars and trucks and video tape rental (e.g., Blockbuster) that have moved heavily toward internet-based services provision in recent years. 33 Th e fi ndings that the real estate industry is procyclical while insurance carriers and related activities are countercyclical are likely in line with most observers' prior intuitions about these sectors.
34 Figure 18 shows that the seemingly diverse professional and business services supersector experienced more-uniform net employment trends than the fi nancial activities supersector. It will surprise few that temporary help services is a strongly procyclical industry, as are the larger administrative and waste services sector and the services to buildings and dwellings sector (which includes janitorial and landscaping services). 35 It is noteworthy and perhaps a good omen for US environmental awareness that the only subsector of the administrative and waste services sector in the structural net employment gains category during the most recent business cycle was waste management and remediation services, which includes waste collection, treatment, and disposal services.
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Th e large and human-capital-intensive professional and technical services sector experienced net structural employment gains in the aggregate, as did several of its individual subsectors: Legal 32. Th e securities and commodity contract investments subsector equals NAICS 523, "Securities, commodity contracts, and other fi nancial investments and related activities." Th e nondepository and activities related to credit intermediation subsector contains NAICS 5222, "Nondepository credit intermediation," and NAICS 5223, "Activities related to credit intermediation."
33. Th is sector equals NAICS 532, "Rental and leasing services."
34. Th e real estate subsector equals NAICS 531, "Real estate." Th e insurance carriers and related activities subsector equals NAICS 524, "Insurance carriers and related activities."
35. Th e temporary help services sector equals NAICS 56132, "Temporary help services." Th e administrative and waste services sector equals NAICS 56, "Administrative and support and waste management and remediation services." Th e services to buildings and dwellings sector equals NAICS 5617, "Services to buildings and dwellings."
36. Th is subsector equals NAICS 562, "Waste management and remediation services." services continues to grow structurally, as does the consulting subsector of management and technical consulting services. 37 It is also signifi cant that, despite continuing media attention on the threats to the US information technology services industry and the fear that this sector may be off shored to India, the computer systems design and related services industry was among the sectors with the strongest net structural employment gains during the most recent US business cycle. 38 Public concerns over the employment prospects of this sector in the United States are misguided. Figure 19 shows the structural employment gains engine of the US economy, the education and healthcare sectors. 39 Both sectors were strongly and almost exclusively in the net structural employment gains category during the most recent business cycle. Only the nursing care facilities subsector was mildly countercyclical. Both sectors seem destined to continue to add jobs relative to other sectors in the years ahead.
Finally, fi gure 20 shows that the net structural employment gains in the leisure and hospitality sector over the last business cycle were overwhelmingly concentrated in the large food services and drinking places industry. 40 Meanwhile, the accommodation (hotels, etc.); amusement, gambling, and recreation; and performing arts, spectator sports, and related industries subsectors were all procyclical.
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As such, the often-heard quip that gambling is a recession-proof industry is not borne out by these data for the current business cycle.
A LOOK AT OCCUPATIONS IN THE MOST RECENT US BUSINESS CYCLE
Th is paper has focused so far on the diff erent net employment trends in individual industries of the US economy during the most recent business cycle. However, it is also instructive to slice up the labor market in another way and to look at how diff erent occupational groups have fared across industries, rather than vice versa. Th is eff ort is hampered, however, by the limited availability of US occupational employment data. But, relying on NBER quarterly peak and trough dates and the detailed quarterly BLS CPS occupational employment data ( Finally, fi gure 21 adds some further nuance to debates on off shoring, as it illustrates disparate net employment trends within the US computer software workforce. Relatively for this particular group of workers, low-skilled and low-wage computer programmers have experienced net structural employment losses, while higher-skilled and higher-wage computer software engineers continue to see strong net structural employment gains. A powerful skill-biased growth pattern that only benefi ts the highest-skilled US software workers seems to be occurring in these occupations. 43 . Th e CPS occupational employment data include farm workers, and unlike the CES, where survey replies are fi lled out by employers, CPS surveys are sent directly to individuals. Both these circumstances tend to increase the weight of the management sector, which includes owner-occupied farms as well as numerous self-reported "managers," who likely infl ate their job responsibilities. Th ese factors account for the surprisingly large size of the management occupations in fi gure 21.
Occupational wage data from the BLS OES database from May 2008
show that sales and related occupations earn more than $5,000 less a year on average than the survey average of $42,270, and offi ce and administrative occupations earn more than $10,000 less a year than the survey average. Figure 21 shows that over the last business cycle, 37 percent of total occupational employment was in the lower-left quadrant and thus experienced net structural employment losses, while 39 percent of the occupational workforce saw net structural employment gains in their occupations. Fourteen percent of occupations were countercyclical, and just 9 percent were procyclical. Similar estimates can be made for the 10 historical cycles that this paper has analyzed, such that for each trough-to-trough business cycle all supersectors can be separated into the four employment trend categories, which can then be weighted by their share of total nonfarm employment at the last trough. Th is is done in table 2.
HISTORICAL EMPLOYMENT SHARES OF INDUSTRIES IN DIFFERENT NET EMPLOYMENT TRENDS
45 Table 2 shows that since the mid-1950s employment gains or losses by industry in the US labor Th e underlying theory of the Beveridge curve is that due to the process of labor-market matching between employers and job seekers, short-term cyclical co-movements in unemployment and vacancy rates occur along a single, fi xed curve. In fi gure 22, during the tight labor markets of expansions we would typically be above the 45° line, with a high level of vacancies and low unemployment, and below the 45° line during economic contractions, with low levels of job vacancies and high(er) unemployment.
An outward shift in the Beveridge curve, as shown in fi gure 22, means that for a given level of vacancies,
given by A in fi gure 22, the associated level of unemployment in an economy rises, as shown in fi gure 22
where the unemployment level increases from B to the higher level C. 45 . Th e result of such exercises of weighting individual industries will depend heavily on the level of aggregation available in industry-level data.
46. See also Beveridge (1944) ; Blanchard and Diamond (1989); and Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (2005) .
Th eoretically, this outward shift implies a decline in the underlying eff ectiveness of the jobmatching process and a corresponding increase in the level of structural unemployment in an economy.
It is precisely such an increase that this paper (fi gure 2 and table 2) suggests may be occurring in the US economy during the most recent business cycle. Th is development would be a reversal of earlier reported inward shifts in the US Beveridge curve during the 1990s. 47 Th e period of improved functioning of the US labor market with corresponding very low, but still noninfl ationary, unemployment rates associated with the 1990s may be drawing to an end.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to overcome the empirical diffi culties involved in constructing historical levels of vacancies in the US economy to verify this assertion for the most recent cycle. 48 However, looking instead at available data for the gross levels of job gains and losses from the States. 50 In other words, the US unemployment rate has risen more than one would normally expect 47. See, for instance, Abraham (1987) , Katz and Krueger (1999), and Valletta (2005 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Th e current US labor-market slowdown is the worst in the postwar period. Unemployment has risen faster than during any earlier recession, while long-term unemployment and labor underutilization levels are higher. Expanding on the methodology of Groshen and Potter (2003) , this paper has analyzed the net structural and cyclical employment trends in the US economy during the last 10 trough-to-trough business cycles from 1949 to the present.
Th e paper has illustrated the historical countercyclical role of government employment, the longterm structural net employment gains of the aggregate services sector, and the similar long-term net structural employment losses in the US manufacturing sector. Th is paper has also shown that net structural employment gains in the US services sector during the most recent cycle have been concentrated in 51. Q1 1983 was chosen as a starting point because it marks the fi rst quarter after the end of the 1981-82 recession. Th e unemployment rates on the x-axis refer to the quarterly BLS CPS US national unemployment rate for 16 year-olds and older, and the real GDP data on the y-axis are standard quarterly BEA data from NIPA table 1.1.6. Unemployment data are lagged one quarter to allow for the delayed response of unemployment to changes in output growth. Th is lag further facilitates the utilization of the latest available data at the time of this writing, such that Q2 healthcare, education, food services, professional and technical services, and in retail and consumeroriented fi nancial sectors. Other US services industries that have historically enjoyed net structural employment gains, such as subsectors of the retail trade, publishing, broadcasting, telecommunications, and the Wall Street fi nancial sectors, have instead seen net structural job losses in the most recent recession.
Meanwhile, some procyclicality (i.e., employment volatility) has been found in several professional and business support industries, such as accounting, bookkeeping, engineering, and architectural services.
Findings at the industry level are largely confi rmed by the similar results found by viewing the US labor market in terms of occupational employment trends over the last economic cycle. Production, offi ce and administrative, sales-related, and transportation occupations have experienced net structural employment losses, while healthcare, education, food preparation, and business and fi nancial occupations have seen net structural employment gains.
Th e relative employment weight of industries undergoing structural change in the current cycle has been found to be just over 60 percent of total nonfarm employment, an increase over the two previous US business cycles. Meanwhile, the employment share of industries seeing net structural employment losses during the current cycle is at 36.2 percent, the highest level since the early 1950s, while just 25 percent of total industries have experienced net structural employment gains during the current cycle, the lowest level in the nine previous US business cycles. First, these results verify that the structural employment decline in the US manufacturing sector is both a long-term trend and one that is broadly based throughout the various manufacturing subsectors.
As such, this decline seems likely to continue. Th e prospects for the reindustrialization of the United States in employment terms thus seem grim. However, US manufacturing output has remained stable in recent decades-real value-added in the manufacturing sector accounted for 14 percent of US GDP in 2008, the same share as in 1988 (BEA 2009). Th is points to the continuing strong productivity performance of the US manufacturing sector.
Second, this paper has suggested that the employment-generating potential of US services sectors is waning outside of education, healthcare, food preparation, and the highest-skilled professional occupations. Employment generation in US services sectors has become more narrowly concentrated in these latter sectors. US structural employment growth in other services sectors, such as trade, transportation, and utilities; information; and many fi nancial services sectors has stopped.
Correspondingly, US employment-growth prospects for many low-and middle-skilled jobs outside of healthcare, education, and food preparation correspondingly look relatively bleak.
Th ird, the increasing relative level of structural employment losses in the United States during the 20 most recent business cycle, which ceteris paribus can be expected to increase the necessity for unemployed
Americans to take new jobs in industries diff erent from the ones in which they were previously employed, will only add further to the already high need to expand the US workforce's access to worker retraining programs, new skill acquisition, and life-long learning opportunities. Congress should acknowledge this important development and should substantially increase the allocation of sustained long-term funding for these purposes. No better way is available for Congress to help struggling US workers.
Fourth, the continued increase in the relative employment weight of what have traditionally been regarded as low-productivity services sectors in the United States-healthcare, education, and food preparation-seems likely to have a negative impact on the future trend of the US potential growth rate. Baumol's cost disease may infect us yet again, as it is far from clear that the US services economy can maintain high productivity as it becomes increasingly dominated by restaurants and hospitals. As such, this paper is generally in line with the bearish projections for long-term US potential output and productivity growth found in, for example, Gordon (2006 and 2008) .
Fifth, the record levels of long-term unemployment and labor underutilization seen in the current contraction, combined with the increasing employment weight of US industries undergoing net structural employment changes and declining levels of labor-market turnover, suggest that the Beveridge curve for the United States may have shifted outward, reversing the inward shift reported during the 1990s. Th e likelihood that the US economy will return to the very low levels of noninfl ationary unemployment seen during the last two expansions therefore seems much reduced. Th is is corroborated by the fi nding that the US Okun's Law relationship in 2009 resembles that found in the US economy in 1975.
Sixth and fi nally, it is important to note that the methodology employed in this paper to identify sectors undergoing structural and cyclical net employment changes does not possess a great deal of direct predictive power in terms of forecasting the immediate employment generating potential of the next US economic recovery. Th e fi nding in this paper of an increasing structural nature of net employment changes in the US economy does not necessarily point in the short term to a very weak or a jobless recovery. However, the results of this paper do suggest that once the immediate job-creating eff ects of the unprecedented fi scal stimulus spending, zero interest rate policy, and cyclical business inventory and real estate investments recede, the US labor market is in for a long, hard slog. S e p -9 2 J u n -9 3 M a r -9 4 D e c -9 4 S e p -9 5 J u n -9 6 M a r -9 7 D e c -9 7 S e p -9 8 J u n -9 9 M a r - One of the striking, if unsurprising, fi ndings of this paper is the 50 plus years of structural employment gains in the US education and healthcare sectors. Given the Obama administration's public commitments both to a historic expansion of healthcare coverage in the United States and to continued improvements in US educational attainment, and combined with the accelerating aging of the US population and high and stable US fertility levels, this structural employment trend is unlikely to change in the coming years if not decades. It is not a coincidence that the healthcare sector is the only sector in the US economy that has consistently added jobs every month throughout the current historic downturn in the labor market. This paper mentioned earlier that the share of government employment in the US nonfarm workforce has remained basically constant since the early 1970s. This relative stability of the share of government employment in the total US workforce stands in marked contrast to the continued expansion of the government sector elsewhere in the OECD and particularly in European countries. Yet before celebrating the United States' victory over the destructive growth of "big government, " it must be kept in mind that the stability of the government's employment share in the United States is partially due to the fact that a large share of education and healthcare services in the United States are provided through the private sector, unlike in Europe, where both education and healthcare are almost exclusively tax-fi nanced, government-provided services.
In thinking about what is occurring in the US labor market, it is therefore useful to compare what US net employment trends would look like over the 10 business cycles that have been the focus of this paper when broken down into "private-sector employment" and "welfare-state employment" (i.e., existing government workers, plus the private education and healthcare sectors). This is done in box fi gure 1 (see next page).
Unlike what we saw in fi gure 4, where the government net employment trend was generally countercyclical in nature while private nonfarm employment was procyclical, box fi gure 1 shows that welfare-state employment in the United States has been characterized by net structural gains, including during two of the last three business cycles. Meanwhile, private-sector employment in the United States excluding the education and healthcare sectors has tended to see net structural employment losses, rather than being procyclical.
As such, the employment growth of welfare-state services provision in the United States has in many ways mirrored the expansion of European welfare states since the 1950s. Small government advocates in the United States have merely succeeded in keeping the provision of many of these welfare-state services of education and healthcare within the private sector; they have not restrained the level and scope (although certainly the distribution) of their provision.
Much of the post-1995 productivity acceleration in the US economy relative to other OECD countries came from higher levels of productivity in the US services sectors (Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh 2008; Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh 2007; van Ark 2005) . However, while productivity levels are exceedingly hard to measure in the education and healthcare sectors (Bosworth and Triplett 2004) , a cursory view of costs and output in both sectors hardly suggests that the United States has enjoyed noteworthy international effi ciency advantages in either sector (Kirkegaard 2009 ). Since these sectors will nonetheless continue to expand their share of the total US economy-proposed reforms are likely to accelerate this trend-they seem likely to constitute an increasingly large low labor-productivity "millstone" around the neck of US potential growth rates. Perhaps Baumol will have the last laugh after all. 
